Chapter Eight Topsy Turvy

The Bowlby question

Behold everyone that useth proverbs shall use this proverb against thee, saying, As is the mother, so is her daughter (Ezekiel 16:44)

All women become like their mothers. That is their tragedy (Oscar Wilde)

As so often, common knowledge, otherwise known as folk wisdom or 'old wives tales', turns out to be way ahead of 'scientifically' proven hypotheses.

It was a question, or comment, always at the back of my mind when, my psyche having reached the level of integration to make it possible, I finally read Bowlby in depth and internalised his insights: isn't this obvious? Surely it's always been known! Yes, by the averagely sensitive good enough mother, but never actually articulated and expounded in a manner that could carry weight. I have had virtually no contact with infants, other than the inner babies of my clients, but it seemed at times mind-boggling that it required so much distressing experimentation on animals, and detailed observation and testing of humans, to prove that it is a bad idea to separate infants from their mothers. Having broadened my informational input to cover sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, and processed the material, it now makes sense and will be dealt with in due course.

John Bowlby's achievement was to perceive the human psyche as that of an evolved animal among related animals, and to apply ethological findings and methods to an understanding of both the healthy mind and psychopathology. His theory of attachment, and therefore of separation and loss, is formulated in terms of genetically encoded structured behavioural systems, including control systems, mediating instinctive behaviour. Such separate behavioural systems are activated by stimuli, either external or internal in origin, and terminated in similar fashion. Such structures evolved in what Bowlby termed the environment of evolutionary adaptedness.

These key concepts struck home. Bowlby's emphasis on, and proofs of, the overriding importance of real experience over against 'phantasy', 'projection', 'death instinct' and other psychoanalytic abstractions was congruent with my own convictions and Fairbairn's ideas, by which Bowlby had of course been influenced (Sutherland, 1989). However his notion of internal working models of attachment figures built up over time did not feel adequate in the face of my own and my clients' internal states. In the last volume of his trilogy, when he moves to information processing theory and substitutes terms such as 'Principal Systems A and B in a postulated hierarchy of evaluating and organising systems' for the label 'executive ego', already distasteful, his theorising dips below my mental horizon. Modern mind sciences seem all set to fall into the same depersonalising trap that Guntrip worked to avoid and that orthodox psychoanalysis still inhabits, losing sight of the whole personhood of the human animal.

My allegiance to Object Relations theory did not waver under the onslaught of a new paradigm, but I had to ask of it what I dubbed the Bowlby Question.

What, in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, was the advantage to the organism of having the conflicts between rejecting, exciting, and ideal objects, and central, libidinal, and anti-libidinal egos continue to play out within the psyche, and therefore repeat themselves externally, throughout its life history?

The answer was immediate and obvious, given clarity by image work and the facility of engaging in it exhibited by so many. The key was the substitution of the term behaviour patterns for the words self or personality. This is not a major move when it is recognised that personality is defined by behaviour. 'He's a cheerful type, always the life and soul of the party.' 'She's so ambitious, she never considers others.'

Let me put forward a composite example compiled from my experience to illustrate my point.

The only daughter among brothers, all of whom were regularly beaten by a hard-drinking, dominating, erratically affectionate but consistently successful, military man, grew up to feel worthless as a woman. She accepted as a marriage partner the one who confirmed her self-image by his habitual derogation of her. On becoming his verbally abused and intimidated wife, she played out an exaggerated repeat of her ineffective mother's role, but because her man was equally successful (and hard-drinking) and in a similar line of work, her children gained the same materially privileged start in life. She had the inner strength to keep them physically safe and, when they grew older, was able to enter the work force herself. In this way she gained sufficient confidence to break away and finance a better life for herself and her children free from emotional turmoil and physical threat. Her brothers meanwhile had developed into hard-drinking, child-beating, but successful professionals, again in occupations where masculine aggression is given status and value while being contained in rigid structures. Though one succumbed to alcoholism, and others to divorce and other problems, all produced children. Biologically speaking, the externalisation of the previously internalised conflicts experienced during infancy and childhood must be reckoned an outstanding success. Darwinian theory does not predicate the survival of the happiest. The selfish gene would confirm the, male, family opinion that 'corporal punishment never did me any harm', and since all were unfaithful to their wives, in a previous century their reproductive success, and therefore that of the original oppressed female as well as her mate, would have been very considerable.

It is clear that the daughter benefited from having available in her psyche not only the behaviour patterns of a doormat but also those of a strong assertive professional. Wilde, in the conclusion to his aphorism, went beyond truth in his search for wit. 'No man does, That's his' misses the mark as the evidence of the brothers who became doormats to drink, or to a mistress, points up. The fact of the re-enactment of childhood trauma in adult life has been dealt with by psychotherapists much better qualified than I to do so. Alice Miller (1983, 1985, 1990) had a powerful impact on my thinking and Robin Norwood (1986) assisted my practise. Their work not only supplies many cogent examples but also reveals the compulsions and complexity produced by interacting behaviour patterns originating in multiple, diverse and ambiguous experiences of suffering. I am concerned to reach what I believe is a basic underlying simplicity and therefore prefer to use elementary illustrations.

What I am postulating are structured behaviour patterns that have the same force as if they were genetically encoded and are similarly activated by specific stimuli, so that the words, 'Late again. Typical!' can be snapped out with the speed of an instinctive response. Transactional analysis would lay the blame for this on the exterio-psyche formed by exposure to the original critical parent. That would match the feeling experience of the client who had consciously resolved to eschew all such negative verbalisations in the quest for reconciliation with the dilatory partner. Psychosynthesis might nominate the 'judge' subpersonality as the intrusive operative, which I think gives a more appropriate responsibility to a self-structure. Jungians could talk of possession by a complex. I think Masud Khan's (1963) concept of cumulative trauma is the formulation that will fit best with evolutionary ideas.

I have read Flanagan (1991) extolling the evolutionary value of human cognition, how faced with problems a whole range of options can be reviewed and the most effective selected. In a sudden confrontation with a sabre-toothed feline on the Pleistocene savannah even the minimal time lapse required by this procedure would surely settle the matter to the satisfaction of the hungry predator. It seems to me from all the evidence available that in an immediate crisis instinct will win hands down over cognition. I am suggesting that the Fairbairn/Guntrip Object Relations theory in actuality charts the mechanism or process whereby experience acquires the force and effectiveness of instinct. The mechanism, I suggest, is genetically encoded and can be recognised as operative in other mammals. In Homo sapiens the larger brain results in experientially structured behaviour patterns of such complexity that they require the designation personality or part-self.

Bowlby incorporates the work of learning theorists into his argumentation but he does not submit his concept of internal working models of attachment figures to an evolutionary critique. In my own thinking I have rejected the word 'learning' for semantic reasons. Its irremovable connotations of voluntarism, of choice, of a time-extensive process, of optionality and most especially of reversibility, though not necessarily intended by Bowlby and others, obscure the reality. I use the words impress and impression because it is a common usage to speak of something making an indelible impression on the mind and that is what I perceive to be the psycho-dynamic situation.

Bowlby reports the simple example of a troop of baboons, once habituated to the approach of vehicles which, after two animals were shot, fled incontinently at the first sight of human or car, and continued this behaviour for many months, uninfluenced by daily 'harmless' passing traffic. He notes the known fact  BOOKMARK  that a response learnt in traumatic circumstances does not extinguish quickly, but his concern was with the 'learning by tradition' by those animals who had not witnessed the killings (Bowlby, 1973: 159). From my perspective those baboons had had impressed on their brains a new compulsive stimulus for the existing behaviour pattern of flight. I recollect scenes, from a TV wild life spectacular, of zebra on the Serengeti watching lions strolling past at close quarters. They were wary but not frightened. It was clear the lions were not hunting. So I do not believe the baboons had learnt to fear objects which made no menacing moves. Rather I would employ Assagioli's (1975) laws of the psyche, one of which states that emotion follows action, to guess that the baboons became afraid each time because they ran away. No one, surely, can doubt the survival, and therefore reproductive, advantages accruing to any wild animal on this planet that acquires a pseudo-instinct to avoid proximity to anything remotely connected with Homo sapiens. I further suggest that the repeatedly good outcome of their behaviour, the baboons clearly survived to flee another day, would serve to strengthen the original impression rather than the 'harmlessness' of any vehicle, which only the owners, presumably, remained to observe, having any power to extinguish it.

If now I turn to the situation of the hominid infant in the Pleistocene environment of evolutionary adaptedness I see it at times carried by good mother, experiencing Klein's good breast, Fairbairn's exciting object but what I will name its rewarding object. This happens when food is in plentiful supply and easily obtained, and when predators and other disasters do not threaten. Inevitably as the dry season advances bad mother, bad breast, rejecting or unrewarding object supervenes. The well fed comfortable body with its abundantly flowing milk transforms into a bony half-starved creature with little to spare in way of nourishment. The female who had energy to expend on grooming and playing with her infant now neglects it as she struggles to keep herself alive. In adulthood this infant will, when the appropriate stimuli so dictate, reproduce each of these maternal behaviour patterns. Its own survival proves that all the behaviours experienced were successful. This is the only criterion the selfish gene can use. Exactly this amount of play, that amount of neglect, will ensure survival of the next generation. But can it be equally advantageous to 'instinctively' replay in maturity the responses of rejected infant and lively infant that were indelibly impressed at the same time? My answer is yes, for reasons similar to those employed by Bowlby to affirm the value of attachment behaviour in adults under stress (see Chapter Nine).

The acquisition of these patterns can be likened to the cumulative trauma mentioned above. Instantaneous trauma must have been quite common in the life of my hypothetical hominid however, and the permanent impression of the associated behavioural responses then would have been just as essential, where today it is unfortunately often debilitating. I think of a client who, as an infant, survived an appalling accident. To the baby self the experience would have been as if virtually crushed to death by, and in, mother. Childhood with a smothering parent did nothing to alter this impression. Therapy proved abortive. The very possibility of continued existence outside the awful security of the mutually 'crushing' relationship painfully exposed in sessions was not genuinely conceivable. This crushing scenario manifested under various guises in imagery and in diverse ways throughout this client's life. However the client did have adult children.

Naturally, primates being social animals, there would have been, for the hominid infant, the behaviours of, and its responses to, the male or males who associated with its mother, also the behaviour patterns of male and female interacting with each other, and the infant's own experiences and actions during such engagements. These episodes could have ranged from routine grooming to the extreme shock of attempted infanticide, such as Hrdy (1999) has detailed. Listening to the appalling stories told by survivors of childhood abuse I have often held unspoken the baffled query, 'How is it possible that this person has grown up sane, and competent to live an outwardly normal life?' The answer I came to through Bowlby's work was that the situation in a dysfunctional family more closely replicates the original environment of evolutionary adaptedness, and that as a result humans are well 'designed' to endure it. Hrdy's evidence has confirmed this and I will return to the issue later. I want here to turn back to the information I set forth at the end of Chapter Six.

Judge Schreber became ill twice in circumstances that were connected symbolically with 'climbing up the ladder'. On the second occasion he had received an important advancement to his career. It is clear from Lothane's investigations that, not satisfied with hospitalisation, he unconsciously acted so as to ensure his involuntary incarceration in an institution in which he would be subjected to behaviours that would parallel his childhood experiences. The whole case can be summarised as the working out of a complex repetition-compulsion, for surely through his legal work, as well as being a man of the world, he must have become fully cognisant of the conditions likely to be found in such asylums. In view of the stories that even today make the tabloid headlines, reporting mistreatment in residential units, I feel I can confidently assume that Schreber suffered actual physical and sexualised abuse at the hands of the asylum attendants. In his extreme stress he had put himself where he would be, like an infant, dependent, powerless, controlled, manipulated, but also free of all responsibility for himself or others. And the results show that this pseudo-instinctive behaviour, mediated by structured impressed behaviour patterns, was effective. He was, firstly, permanently removed from the judicial post which caused such 'life-threatening' stress, a step his conscious mind would surely never have taken. Then he was forced to take the time to develop new responses of assertive resistance to his oppressors. Separated from 'good objects' supporting him, he could draw on the more useful but unused adult behaviour patterns also in his psyche to express, and so impress, new behaviours sufficient to obtain his release, return to his wife and adopt a daughter. In this way he achieved, at least symbolically, the agenda of his selfish genes, from whose perspective his subsequent unhappy death was irrelevant.

I am proposing that such psychoanalytic terms as transference, resistance, projection and repetition-compulsion, are labelling aspects of a fundamentally simple generic intra-psychic survival mechanism which enforces the basic safety rules 'do as you did', 'be as you were', 'go where you've been'. To take the last one which governed Schreber, I can image its value to a group of hominids driven beyond familiar territory by encroaching predators or competitive omnivorous consumers. If they are impelled to move purposefully until they find themselves with sufficient stimuli emanating from their surroundings to approximately match an inner template that evokes, for example, 'dig for food' behaviour, they are quite likely to find edibles even though not looking or tasting as expected. These variant stimuli together with new ones would then be 'learned' if the move was relatively benign, but 'impressed' if the group was in extremis. The distinction I make is really one of degree. Chimpanzees learn to fish for termites (Goodall, 1990) but have no compulsion to do so. The baboons showed the force of traumatic impression, and also the necessary failsafe in the mechanism, the possibility of total reversal. 'Do the opposite of what you did' (if approach car). The Rat Man's doing and undoing (Freud, 1909) a typical obsessive compulsive behaviour, might relate to this underlying system.

The image work I have facilitated over the years demonstrates the ease with which the 'I' can transfer from one intra-psychic structure to another, with instant change of perceptions, emotions and behaviours. Externally this has been very commonly observed, as when an employee switches from being a brow-beating persecutor with an underling to being subserviently ingratiating towards the boss. All the while, of course, remaining personally oblivious of such behaviour. The hominid male, having internalised 'dangerous dominant male' behaviour patterns and responsive 'placating dependent' behaviours that resulted in survival to maturity, would similarly slip automatically into the appropriate identification when confronted with a group mate occupying the opposite pole. Most impressed behaviours would be bi-polar. Impressed dominant male behaviour patterns would be more congruent with male internal stimuli, hormonal for example, and so would be most frequently expressed in actuality in maturity, and similarly for maternal behaviours in females. But all bi-polar behaviours once experienced remain available in the psyche because it has been of evolutionary advantage that it should be so.

As a psychotherapist I wish to illustrate the compulsiveness of the pseudo-instinctive behaviours resulting from multiple-trauma and of its bi-polar form. To do so I will bring in a distressing example, that of Mary Bell.

I will pick out a succession of facts from the childhood experiences that preceded Mary's act of throttling a four-year-old boy when she herself was eleven. Mary's mother, Betty,  BOOKMARK  expressed hostility towards her baby, several times abandoned her, and was present when 'accidents' occurred that almost caused the toddler's death. When Mary was three her uncle just managed to catch her by her ankles as she fell from a window near which her mother had been holding her. Up until she was eight, Betty had often arranged for her daughter to be used for oral sex by her own customers while she held her child's head back by the hair, sometimes gagging her or blindfolding her while alternative abuse occurred. Mary was beaten, dragged by her hair, threatened. 'I had been picked up by my throat lots of times, by my mother, by some of the clients... She used to say "It won't hurt" and when I'd lose consciousness and then wake up I'd hear her say, "It'll be alright". (Sereny, 1998: 345).

Mary's first descriptions of Martin's death involved both of them falling through a hole in the ceiling of a derelict house. In the final telling, when she took responsibility, she related how the little boy had followed her into the building, refusing to go home as ordered. She had dragged him crying and resisting up the broken stairs but soon after had let him down through the hole and dropped him gently. In the room below she had knelt in front of the smaller child, who was standing, unhurt, in a corner, told him to put his hands round her throat, put hers round his, and pressed and pressed.

Mary did not know why she had acted as she did, or believe that she could have wanted to hurt Martin. In answer to questions about motive and feelings she said, often using the present tense as she 'saw' behind her closed eyes,

'I'm not angry. It isn't a feeling ... it is a void that comes ... opens ... it's an abyss ... it's beyond rage, beyond pain, it's black cotton wool ... It's a draining of feeling ... It's like a light being switched off ... It's like a train behind you and you have to walk ... keep walking ... no noise ... muddy waters ... I told you about when I jumped into a pool and almost drowned ... but I can only equate it up to a certain point because there was no light, no physical pull, no sensation ...Walking ahead of the train gets more suffocating in your head ...But, it's black cotton wool, one has to get through it ... One would die.
(Sereny, 1998: 350)

I have italicised key words which disclose the anti-libidinal, and others that link this experience with the survival of asphyxiating abuse by psychological disconnection from the body. I note the falsifying of her reality imposed on Mary, as on Schreber and some of my clients. I see that the position of unhappy dependent helpless little child was occupied by Martin, pushing Mary inexorably into its linked opposing structure of abusive mother, and how accurately the ensuing scenario reflected earlier events. If my adult client, who snapped at her partner, could not hold to her resolve against the power of pseudo-instinct, what chance was there for a child? Once again I must point out, horrible though it seems, that the basic survival mechanism worked. Mary was removed from her mother's control, placed under the supervision of an inspiring caring Headmaster, from whom she received a powerful impression of more beneficial behaviours, and is today a good mother raising a healthy daughter. The selfish gene wins out.

This last fact points up an important factor in Homo sapiens that would not have been present to any degree in the first hominids - self-conscious choice. Mary as a child had observed and recognised, the 'opposite' behaviours, had even expressed the desire to escape to them, but they were too 'distant' to make any impression that could counter the anti-authority, anti-morality ethos that enveloped her. I can hypothesise that as physical changes begin to herald maturity similar effects in the psyche would tend to move the 'I' into the adult pole of behavioural structures. This would be enhanced by the need to escape the pain of the dependent pole. As an adult Mary had the power to choose, when relating to her daughter, to draw on observations integrated with the later beneficial impressions to be the loving mother she had never experienced. Whenever the dependent pole was occupied by her child she could intentionally transfer into the positive behavioural structure, though at other times Mary remained a chaotic individual.

Bowlby (1973) describes one little child's attempt to solve her environmental problem in just the way I am postulating. Lottie was taken to nursery school at the age of two years and three months, too young to cope with the experience, as Bowlby has shown. After only a week Lottie was arriving wearing, at her own insistence, a skirt like that of her five-and-a-half-year-old sister. Soon she was claiming she was Dorrie and demanding to be called by that name. This attempt to move her consciousness into the structure that would have been formed in her psyche by her association with this sister, who was old enough to cope, did not last, but of course she had never actually observed Dorrie's behaviour at the nursery, the environment in question.

Margaret Mahler (1975) in the United States, while researching the psychoanalytic concept of 'separation', the psychological birth of an infant from the symbiotic merger with mother, observed an almost identical episode. Because of family problems that put great stress on his mother, little Teddy, denied her attention, had become very dependent on his brother Charlie, older by fourteen months. When he reached his third year, time for the major separation phase, Teddy, like Lottie, wanted to wear his brother's clothes and called himself Charlie. Bowlby made it clear that it is not the degree of kinship but the actuality of the relating, whether positive or negative, that creates the attachment bond: in my terms, the deepest impression.

A client of mine once came to a session in distress, having walked out of the new job which had seemed, when accepted a few weeks earlier, so ideal in every way. How could it have proved intolerable? It took less than the hour to unpack the symbolic equivalence of every personality in the new office with a character impressed by the template of this client's original, abuse-denying, extended dysfunctional family.

I will include one little example of impressed stimuli doing their job more as nature intended. Another client, in the closing sessions of her therapy, could only find, to talk about, a sense of anxiety around her finances for which there was no justification. The matter was dealt with by a reminder that at this time last year, in the run up to Christmas, she had become so involved with internal issues as to lose track of her spending and had been very shocked to discover herself close to a dangerous over-commitment. The festive signs were clearly stimulating unconscious warnings based on that experience.

What I am positing is fundamentally a variant form of Lamarckianism, a genetic basis ensuring the inheritance of acquired behavioural characteristics. These would be relatively simple in unconscious primates but rendered very complex in the meaning-creating brains of Homo sapiens. Goodall (1990) records that the innovative form of play used with her infants by chimp super-mum Flo was later adopted by her adult daughter Fifi with her baby. Experiments have shown that complex play, when young, builds better neural connections in the brain so this is a simple instance of survival advantage.

I have always been sceptical of the 'flavour of the month' trend towards allocating genetic causes to psychopathology. Firstly, it seems such an obvious example of the natural human tendency to abrogate responsibility. 'The fault, dear Brutus, is in our genes and not ourselves that we are underlings' to coin a misquote. In the popular press it sometimes appears as if genetics ranks as the new astrology. It frees the self from blame while more subtly dumping it on others, providing a 'scientific' basis for the old adage 'bad blood will out'.

To take schizophrenia as a case in point, Stevens and Price (1996) accept a genetic aetiology and produce a convoluted charismatic-leadership-in-group- splitting hypothesis to prove that the condition was of survival value in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness. For an alternative explanation of the finding that psychosis runs in families see above and also Laing and Esterson (1970). For an alternative understanding of why children reared apart from their schizophrenic mothers nevertheless fall victim to the condition with a statistically significant frequency, consider the womb environment as a causative factor (stop press: New Scientist, 21.7.2001. 'Those findings ... have convinced many experts that the brain abnormalities that lead to schizophrenia come about very early in development, most likely before birth'). Lake asserts:

The tap root, as it were, which is responsible for many of the most characteristic and severely self-damaging features of schizoid affliction, must now be firmly placed in the first trimester, within three or so months of conception.
(Lake, 1981: 23).

His conclusions, reached through the practice of psychotherapy, receives support from work like Piontelli's and I adduce clinical material such as Tara's 'whirlpool' experience of attempted abortion which pre-conditioned not only her imagery but also her life responses.  BOOKMARK 

Two weeks after conception the neurons that will become the foetal brain are in existence and 'By the end of the first month in the womb, a primitive brain has already been formed.' (Greenfield, 1997: 95). As neurons divide and proliferate what is of prime importance, the connections between them, also multiply. Put simply experience effects neuronal circuitry. Kittens trained to lift one paw to discriminate between two visual signals showed, upon examination, brains with 30 per cent more connections in that part of the cortex receiving sensation input from that paw. In her concluding chapter Greenfield asks, 'Of what might a foetus be conscious'; one of the puzzles still to be solved. Psychotherapy has long been supplying one type of answer, but I have digressed into neuro-physiology only to provide an indication that my hypothesis is not in conflict with the biological sciences.

Finally, in all my high speed acquisition of a basic literacy in the fields of knowledge into which my 'road to Damascus' revelation precipitated me, I found an affirmation of my resistance to the dominance of raw genetics. I will quote Hrdy (1999: 74).

'In varied and unpredictable worlds there will be more than one way to survive and reproduce'.....Increasingly biologists are aware that mammals - including primates like ourselves - can develop along different pathways, even assume different forms or exhibit quite different behavioural profiles, depending on what development track they find themselves on. However, the underlying mysteries in a large-bodied, socially complex, and long-lived organisms are far harder to pin down ... [than] in the honey-bees.

The author is referring here not only to unobservable factors such as intra-uterine nutritional and hormonal input, but also to maternal effects like inherited status or alliances. Female offspring of dominant Old World monkeys and apes fall heir to a high rank in the pecking order, and Fifi in fact was able to assume possession of Flo's very 'lucrative' territory within the Gombe troupe's larger range after her mother died.

I want to put together from Hrdy's own observations of hanuman langur monkeys what I find to be an intriguing possible example of the effects of inherited impressed behaviour patterns. Langurs practice what Hrdy calls infant sharing and alloparenting. She describes how infants, in the groups formed of related females, are readily farmed out by their mothers, who benefit from having their offspring cared for by others because they are then free to feed efficiently, producing more milk. This builds faster-maturing young. When Hrdy goes into more detail however it turns out that infants are 'spirited away' from their mothers, often before the mother is willing, by group mates who stalk the new mother in the secluded spot she has found for her acouchement. Infants can be passed around from one female to another for up to 50 per cent of the day and only get uninterrupted time at the breast at night. Observing in the field, Hrdy found it immensely hard to bear the cries of distress uttered by these infants as they were forcibly torn from their mother, and then from one alloparent by another, sometimes being very roughly handled. Nevertheless she concludes that both 'over-burdened' langur mothers, and eager-to-acquire-parenting-skills young allomothers, all come out ahead and the infants seem 'none the worse' for their ordeal (sound familiar?). Only 0.2 per cent of immature males attempt to take babies but this changes drastically when a male becomes mature and powerful enough to drive out the 'owner' of a troupe of females and take reproductive possession. Then he stalks each female carrying an infant that, naturally, is not of his getting, and when he succeeds in snatching it, he kills it. The female then permits copulation. Her replacement infant will be safe from this male and, if lucky, will have achieved maturity before the next take over.

Of course this author is not implying any intentionality by her racy language. Behaviour that results in more offspring will survive and flourish and it is now recognised that males and females can be competitors in this respect, what is sauce for the goose is not necessarily adaptive sauce for the gander. Behaviours resembling the ones described above, when found in humans, are labelled both criminal and pathological and I would follow Miller, Norwood and others in ascribing its aetiology to early trauma. It is perhaps too easy to do the same in the case of the langur monkeys and see them enmeshed in impressed behaviour patterns: the maltreated-in-infancy adolescent allo-mother trying hard to keep her borrowed baby happy (as several of my schizoid clients gave support to children not their own), while older allo-mothers quickly lose interest after a successful snatch, and reject forcefully now clinging youngsters (just as clients rejected inner children or clinging dependent lovers). The male expression of the pattern shows the fatal aggression that the masculine hormonal agenda can superimpose. It is clear that if infant-sharing has become genetically encoded in langur mothers, tolerance of being shared has not yet entrenched itself in the infants. Nor has tolerance of infanticide taken hold. Each mother makes strenuous efforts to save her offspring from the aggressor, often aided by female kin, even sometimes carrying it away from the group to abandon it into the care of the ousted male.

I can lift a human anecdote from the same source for comparative purposes. It seems that among South American indigenous peoples a prejudice against babies born without hair is common and Hrdy quotes a report from ethnographers Hill and Hurtido on the fate of such a one born to an Ach? girl. Its father was dead and this mother already re-married. The new-born was examined by the group, with no signs of acceptance, but the man who actually spoke the condemnation was one whose own younger sibling had been buried by his mother because the birth spacing had been too close. On this occasion he advised burial not only because of the hairless head but also because, he said, the new husband, absent, did not want it. The girl said nothing and the baby was put into its grave. Here are shown cultural patterns in collusion with personal ones, the mother of the speaker had also been advised to kill her new baby because her milk was needed for the older child. But cultural patterns must form from those of individuals.

These two examples hardly touch the surface of infanticide as a behaviour pattern among primates, including humans, exhibited by both males and females, of male and/or female infants. In many species males can by this means gain sexual access to females rendered fertile by the loss of the suckling young. Both chimpanzees and gorillas kill infants but, to cast doubt on a simple genetic factor, bonobos (pygmy chimps) have not been observed to do so. In humans infanticide is common in tribal raids, warfare situations and when resources are scarce. It can be observed in 'developed' cultures both for 'acceptable' reasons (to make space for a son) and as criminal acts. Witness the statistically increased risk of death for a baby when a new man enters its mother's life. Hrdy lines up with those who think that all the evidence only points to a convergence of observed behaviours stemming from shared genetic possibilities rather than imperatives, analogous rather than homologous patterns. Rosita's dream (Chapter Three) illuminates the issue from a different angle.

Evolutionists have coined the phrase 'genetic assimilation' to label the process whereby a learned behaviour is subsequently tracked genetically. An individual organism with genes that favoured the execution of an adaptive learned behaviour would carry it out more successfully, leave more offspring, and so spread those genes down the generations. My proposition, that mammalian brains have increasingly developed the capacity to retain indelible 'impressions' of traumatically, or cumulatively, experienced behaviour patterns, merely enhances this idea. However in a species inhabiting a great variety of environments, with a brain size capable of incorporating an infinity of patterns, the 'tracking' process would, I think, have a greatly reduced impact.

However, I have moved way ahead of my story, for all this sociobiological information and speculation was unknown to me before my midnight enlightenment. What did become comprehensible after I had answered the Bowlby question was the persistence of orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis in the pole position of power vis-?-vis all later developments. The conditions of an analysis, years of four- or five-day-a-week sessions, are well suited to firmly impress the patterns of the analyst on the psyche of the analysand, irrespective of curative power, accuracy of interpretation, or other factors. Even such a one as Fairbairn, whose isolated situation in Edinburgh allowed him to develop an independent line of theorising and throw off the demonstrable falsities in Freud's ideas, nevertheless in later life reverted to the style of orthodox practice with which he had originally been 'impressed'. He was 'formal in sessions the intellectually precise interpreting analyst' as his analysand Guntrip (1975: 450) records.

Of course I needed to place Guntrip's addition to Fairbairn's theory into an evolutionary context and it was this which took me to the  BOOKMARK  foetal origins of human evolution. If the regressed ego was a behaviour pattern, it must represent the first survival strategy. If I delineate this as 'curl up in a small dark place and wait' it is immediately recognisable as indeed one of humanities most pervasive behaviours. How many people hid under the stairs when the bombs were falling, or hide under the bedclothes when life gets too much to bear? Children are naturally afraid of the dark (Bowlby, 1969) but never of very small dark hidey holes. One client, whose mother would shut him in a cupboard, when a toddler, while she popped out, commented on how safe it felt. An abused child, escaping back to an empty house, climbed into the wardrobe, shut the door and went to sleep.

Having reached this point half way through that M.A. course, I was quite satisfied that I had come to the natural conclusion of my project and only needed to actually write the book. How ill-informed consciousness can be about the doings of the psyche in which it is such a late-come guest! Just a year before the penning of this sentence, the mental floodgates opened, turned all my preconceptions and certainties upside down, and presented me with the realisation that the great bugbear of my psychotherapeutic endeavours, the anti-libidinal force, the so-called internal saboteur, was in reality the prime mover and shaker in the emergence of a humane humanity. In the next chapter I shall put forward the inside story of human evolution.

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